Fees and throughput regulation dynamics

[hashdag]

Context: based rollups.

Since L2’s are permissionless, they too need a mechanism to cap their throughput. As per the custom, let’s refer to the computational load on L2 nodes in gas units. This load applies to any L2 operator – entities parsing the state, eg L2 explorers, wallets, etc. – but more importantly to provers. The latter’s load is 2-3 order of magnitude heavier than entities merely executing the state.

What entities should regulate L2 throughput? One could imagine a setup where an L2 instance caps its own throughput by encoding a gas limit rule in its program, but this could lead to an undesirable outcome where users’ transactions are included in L1 blocks but ignored by the corresponding L2. If we want to avoid such horrible UX, then L1 sequencers are the only relevant entities to take on the responsibility of regulating L2 throughput.

Let’s start by defining the requirements for a regulation mechanism:

1. L2 throughput must be capped.
2. L1 shouldn’t typically include transactions that exceed the throughput cap.
3. L2 quality of service (QoS) should be preserved: Users with higher urgency should be able to prioritize their txns. (This crucial property is often overlooked, ignoring this requirement can lead to practical DoS for urgent transactions, similarly to the havoc on KAS, June '24, due to the lack of RBF to deal with txn congestion.)
4. The mechanism shouldn’t rely on users’ honesty or miners’ goodwill.
5. The mechanism shouldn’t require L1 actors executing L2 logic.
6. L2 provers should be compensated for sustainability.

One simple approach we propose (@FreshAir08 +the usual suspects) is:
i. Transaction issuers declare the maximum gas their transactions consume.
ii. Miners ensure no more than X gas units are confirmed per block per L2 instance (enforced in L1 consensus).
iii. Transactions that exceed their declared maximum gas are reverted but still pay their fees, similar to Ethereum L1 rules. Note: Wallets can typically provide reasonable gas estimates. Even for complex transactions, users can often give tight bounds, so they won’t usually suffer from gross misestimates.
iv. Transactions that don’t exhaust their declared gas still pay the full gas fee to L2 from the perspective of L1. Whether this is refunded to the user within L2 logic is outside this discussion. [A riddle for the reader: If users are refunded the gas change, can they overestimate gas just to be lazy? Why not?]

It is easy to verify that this design satisfies all aforementioned requirements.

Observe an important implication of this design: When L2 demand is high, revenue and fees go to L1 sequencers, not to L2 provers. I argue this is not a problem, and the preservation of L1’s security budget outweighs L2 layer biz model concerns. An alternative proposal will be be described at the end of the post.

Another observation is that introducing gas units and limits per block (point ii above) adds complexity for sequencers (miners) optimizing their blocks. It effectively creates a multi-knapsack problem for sequencers, which is NP-hard. However, this computation isn’t done on-chain or in consensus, and simple heuristics can achieve a sufficient approximation of the optimal solution. Importantly, this challenge isn’t unique to gas units; similar considerations apply to storage-mass (KIP9) units. See KIP13 by @coderofstuff.

Importantly, each L2 instance can define its own interpretation and scale for gas—there’s no implication in L1 consensus about what gas specifically means. If one instance computes gas differently — whether in a simple or complex manner — that’s fine. L2 instances can also dynamically adjust gas scales based on load (@proof note this). However, this dynamic adjustment should be carefully designed to avoid situations where users’ transactions are included by miners but ignored by L2 programs, causing fee loss and poor UX.

Finally, since we proposed that all transaction fees — regardless of rising demand — flow to sequencers, one might ask how L2 provers are paid and what guarantees their compensation and sustainability. One alternative advocated by @someone235 is that a fraction of L1 fees associated with a certain L2 instance flow to its P2SH address and be distributed to provers via its PROG. Hopefully others can evaluate this direction or provide alternative L2 sustainability schemes

[FreshAir08]

A couple of notes and thoughts. Many of these might protrude a bit into the realm of the L2 design itself which may be out of scope but I want to mention them for the reader.

First, there is no real problem in the L2 requiring another inner L2 fee in proportion to the L1 miner fee (if the inner fee is not sufficient, txs are included but considered invalid from the L2 perspective) is there? I think of the inner fee moving to a SC with its locked money only released by a proof tx. That’s a cleaner way to reward L2 provers for high activity in their subnet imo than forcing L1 to deal with the distribution. Upon reread that might be what was suggested in the post but I wouldn’t use the term “L1 fees” for that.

Second, without stepping too much into the L2 shoes, I believe L2 rewards should encourage fast proving in some manner, i.e. rewarding higher fees for proofs that come “fast enough”. Could be handled in a similar manner to what I suggested above, with the excess money going back to the original payer if proofs didn’t arrive fast enough. Of course this does not apply to all L2: some may just be service providers and will provide fast proofs to their clients as part of their service.

Lastly one might ponder what happens if the monetary policy of L2 ends up being unsustainable due to price drop, or unjust due to price increase. L2s can and arguably should have some update mechanism for the gas scale (and potentially other things). Obviously this update mechanism and the extents of what is allowed to be updated, presents many questions of L2 governance, which L2 creators will need to address according to their specific needs and ethea.

[oudeis]

Do I understand correctly why “revenue and fees go to L1 sequencers, not to L2 provers” – is it precisely because it “adds complexity for sequencers (miners) optimizing their blocks”? Before, miners were incentivized to perform only the optimization to select transactions based on storage-mass, now, in addition to that, they will also perform transaction selection based on gas amount. While economics and profitability of miner business very much depends on the demand and the competition, we can think of ZK provers as almost having constant costs to operate - therefore, they are not in danger if they are paid just enough?

Or maybe you say a more general thing, since you seem to downplay the actual amount of additional work they will do in practice, that it is only miners that are incentivised in the system for increased demand for block space, no matter where the demand is coming from?

[hashdag]

Even if L2 txns incur no special costs to miners, no added complexity etc., still the miners are inevitably the entity to receive users’ txn fees and to enjoy surge in demand for L2 txns, b/c they are the (only) gatekeepers to the entire system, so the user must incentivize them – bribe, if you may – in order to be sequenced sooner rather than later. The more pressure and demand for L2 txns – the more impatient users are willing to pay to enter the sequencing in a timely manner – and if this willingness to pay does not transfer to the miners themselves in the form of greater revenue from these impatient txns then the miner would ignore these high priority txns, which destroys the QoS and practically leads to a DoS for L2.

Whether you need another L2-dictated form of payment or mechanism to satisfy the economics or sustainability of provers – I did not form a strong opinion on that, there are several options that come to mind. One could argue, as you
mentioned, that provers’ load is const and therefore they should require no extra compensation, others can argue that a healthy macro dynamic is one where service providers receive higher compensation in case of higher interest/demand in their services. L2’s can decide their own mechanism here, as long as they comprehend that fees for prioritization under demand must inherently flow to the miners.